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Although the Supreme Court articulated the basic principles of
American Indian law two centuries ago, incongruous and divergent poli-
cies have developed, particularly with respect to criminal jurisdiction.'
The issue of which entity regulates criminal matters in Indian country2
- the Indian tribe, state government, or federal government - has
prompted some to describe the situation as a "maze,' 3 "quagmire," 4 or
"crazy-quilt."' Legal schemes and maps have been created to aid judges,
tribal members, and state law enforcement officers.6 Federal and state
courts often take inconsistent positions.7 Moreover, the Supreme Court's
1. See Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands. A Journey Through a Jurisdictional
Maze, 18 ARIz. L. REv. 503 (1976); Vollmann, Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Tribal
Sovereignty and Defendants' Rights in Conflict, 22 U. KAN. L. REv. 387 (1974); Note, The Legal
Trail of Tears: Supreme Court Removal of Tribal Court Jurisdiction Over Crimes By and Against
Reservation Indians, 20 NEw ENG. L. REv. 247 (1984-85).
2. Indian country is a confusing term in and of itself, encompassing numerous concepts. See
D. GETCHES & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 338-41 (1986) [hereinafter FEDERAL IN-
DIAN LAW]; Clinton, supra note 1, at 507-13. Congress defined "Indian country" in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1151 (1982), a jurisdictional statute adopted in 1948:
[T]he term "Indian country," as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of
any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwith-
standing the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the res-
ervation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States
whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within
or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which
have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
Id.
3. Clinton, supra note 1, at 504.
4. T. TAYLOR, THE BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 92 (1984) [hereinafter BIA].
5. Vollmann, supra note 1, at 387.
6. See Clinton, supra note 1. See also Kimbrell, Indian Land Map Confuses Sheriff, District
Attorney, Tulsa World, Dec. 10, 1987 at El, col.1.
7. See, e.g., Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 829 F.2d
967 (10th Cir. 1987), cerL denied, 108 S. Ct. 2870 (1988); State ex rel. May v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe,
711 P.2d 77 (Okla. 1985). In Seneca-Cayuga, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the trial
court's determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the state could regulate
Indian bingo games if an evidentiary hearing revealed that non-Indians and Indians who are non-
members of the tribe would be adversely affected. The supreme court remanded the case to the trial
court for an evidentiary hearing on the matter. However, before the evidentiary hearing was con-
ducted, the trial court was enjoined from conducting an evidentiary hearing by the federal district
1
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"test ' 8 for settling Indian law issues has evolved into an ad hoc balancing
test of established principles and competing interests.9 Ethical considera-
tions linger.
A state's authority over criminal matters within Indian territory is
limited, 10 so the implementation, management, and expense of law en-
forcement are typically left to the tribes and the federal government. 1
The state has its burden, though, for it must determine if a criminal vio-
lation involved Indians or non-Indians 2 and if the crime occurred on
Indian land. 3 In Oklahoma, the quandry over which entity has jurisdic-
tion is magnified, because allotted Indian lands are interwoven with state
land. 4 Although the Bureau of Indian Affairs has recently deputized
state law enforcement officers so that they may pursue crimes occurring
on Indian land,' 5 such measures signify no more than a temporary solu-
tion. 6 The predicament has resulted in hostilities, with many question-
ing the need for or doubting the existence of Indian sovereignty. 7
Although society has changed considerably since Chief Justice John
Marshall delineated the special relationship of Indian tribes to federal
and state governments, the legal reality of inherent tribal sovereignty has
not withered away with time.'8 For legal and ethical reasons, the right to
court in Seneca-Cayuga Tribe v. Oklahoma, No. 85-C-639-B (consolidated with 86-C-393-B), slip
op. (N.D. Okla. 1986). Oklahoma appealed the ruling, and the case is currently pending before the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
8. See infra notes 70-112 and accompanying text. See generally C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN
INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW (1986).
9. See C. WILKINSON supra note 8, at 1-4, 29-52; Clinton, State Power Over Indian Reserva-
tions: A Critical Comment on the Burger Court Doctrine, 26 S.D.L. REv. 434 (1981). See generally
Note, supra note 1.
10. For half a century, state incursions in Indian territory were barred completely. See infra
notes 30-52 and accompanying text.
11. See BIA, supra note 4, at 84-86. See also FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at 402-03
(quoting NATIONAL AMERICAN INDIAN COURT JUDGES ASS'N, INDIAN COURTS AND THE FU-
TURE 33-35 (D. Getches ed. 1978)).
12. Clinton, supra note 1, at 513-20.
13. Clinton, supra note 1, at 507-13; Vollmann, supra note I, at 389-96. See Robertson, Indian
sovereignty issue has officials scratching heads, Tulsa Tribune, Dec. 3, 1987, at Al, col. 4.
14. Kickingbird, Oklahoma Indian Jurisdiction: A Myth Unravelled, 9 AM. INDIAN J. 4, 4-5
(1986). The author begins by stating, "Perhaps in no other state has there been more confusion over
who has jurisdiction in Indian Country than in the State of Oklahoma." Id. at 4. See also F. COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 775-79 (1982).
15. Telephone interview with Tim Vollmann, Regional Solicitor for the United States Depart-
ment of Interior (May 17, 1988).
16. See Brown, Sovereignty rights defended by Indians, Tulsa Tribune, June 4, 1988, at A8, col.
1.
17. See, eg., Kimbrell, Area Indians Call Response To Court Decision "Dumb," Tulsa World,
Dec. 3, 1987, at Al, col.1.
18. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (McLean, J., concurring). Justice
McLean saw the manifest destiny of the Indian tribes differently. He recognized their need for
[Vol. 24:89
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tribal self-government should be maintained. However, because court de-
cisions have fluctuated, 19 Indian tribes in Oklahoma, to protect against
further incursions upon their sovereignty, should examine the possibility
of resolving some of these issues outside of the court system,20 as tribes in
other states have done.21
A compact between tribe and state, approved by Congress,22 would
be beneficial in Oklahoma, since recent court decisions, coupled with the
muddle of allotted Indian lands, indicate troubled times ahead. An ex-
amination of the basic principles of tribal sovereignty, the evolution of
criminal jurisdiction, and the inconsistencies of court decisions will
demonstrate that resolving criminal jurisdiction disputes outside of the
courtroom would be in the state's and the tribes' best interests.23 Litiga-
tion is costly and time-consuming. Moreover, the courts have adjudi-
cated criminal jurisdiction issues on an ad hoe basis, resulting in a
piecemeal, narrow approach to many conflicts.
In reevaluating the need for criminal jurisdiction, a tribe may find
that its goals and budget may not necessitate the policing of members
and prosecution of minor crimes.24 By reaching an agreement with the
state, tribes could trade criminal jurisdiction for more useful resources,
such as land,25 particularized regulation,26 or cash.27 Most importantly,
resolving the issue would supplant confusing, unproductive disputes with
lucid policies that would quell the tension between both entities, effectu-
ating a more productive atmosphere for all.
sovereignty at the time, but added, "The exercise of the power of self-government by the Indians,
within a state, is undoubtedly contemplated to be temporary." Id. at 593. Justice McLean perpetu-
ated his idea of withering Indian sovereignty in decisions he made while riding circuit. FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at 60.
19. See generally Clinton, supra note 9; Note, supra note 1.
20. C. WILKINSON, supra note 8, at 9.
21. Brodeur, Annals of Law: Restitution, New Yorker, 76 (Oct. 11, 1982) [hereinafter Res-
titution].
22. Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971). Since the Indian commerce clause, U.S.
CONsT., art I, § 8, cl.3, and the treaty clause U.S. CONST., art II, § 2, cl.2, grant Congress exclusive
power to regulate Indian tribes, there is a clear need, in dealing with tribes, for Congressional
approval.
23. Interview with Tim Vollmann, Regional Solicitor, United States Dept. of the Interior, in
Tulsa, Okla. (Feb. 16, 1988); Interview with Ross Swimmer, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for
Indian Affairs, in Tulsa, Okla. (Feb. 26, 1988). See also FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at
547; BIA, supra note 4, at 89.
24. Interview, Swimmer, supra note 23.
25. See Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6202
(1982). See generally BIA, supra note 4, at 107-16; Restitution, supra note 21.
26. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at 729-30.
27. See Washington State Tribes Receive $1.8 Million, 9 AM. INDIAN 1. 21 (1987).
1988]
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II. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY: SOURCES OF POWER AND LIMITATIONS
ON SELF-GOVERNMENT
A. The Foundation of Indian Law Principles: The Marshall Trilogy
A trilogy of cases decided between 1823 and 1832 fashioned the ba-
sic framework of American Indian law and fixed legal concepts which
continue to bind court decisions. The most important principles are in-
herent tribal sovereignty, broad federal powers over Indian affairs, and
limited state power. Inherent tribal sovereignty means that a tribe, by
virtue of its status as such, has the inherent right to govern itself.28 The
United States Constitution grants to the federal government exclusive
power to deal with Indian tribes, which results in broad federal powers
over tribal affairs. Plenary federal power, coupled with inherent tribal
sovereignty, constitutes an arduous barrier to the infringement of state
power on tribal affairs.2 9
1. Johnson v. McIntosh and the Doctrine of Discovery
In Johnson v. McIntosh,3 ° an 1823 land claim dispute between two
non-Indians, Chief Justice Marshall determined the status of Indian title
to land with respect to the federal government. Employing a concept
that European nations used to recognize title to newly found land, Mar-
shall streamlined the "doctrine of discovery ' 3 and contended that dis-
covery and possession consummated title in the nation that first came
upon the land.32 The claim obstructed intrusions by other nations. 33
28. See infra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
30. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). For a discussion of the impact of the doctrine of discovery
as a basis of Congress' plenary power in dealing with Indian tribes, see Newton, Federal Power Over
Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 207-11 (1984).
31. Justice Marshall summarized the doctrine of discovery as follows:
But, as they were all in pursuit of nearly the same object, it was necessary, in order to avoid
conflicting settlements, and consequent war with each other, to establish a principle, which
all should acknowledge as the law by which the right of acquisition, which they all as-
serted, should be regulated as between themselves. This principle was, that discovery gave
title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all
other European governments, which title might be consummated by possession. The exclu-
sion of all other Europeans, necessarily gave to the nation making the discovery the sole
right of acquiring the soil from the natives, and establishing settlements upon it. It was a
right with which no Europeans could interfere. It was a right which all asserted for them-
selves, and to the assertion of which by others, all assented. Those relations which were to
exist between the discoverer and the natives, were to be regulated by themselves. The rights
thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could interpose between them.
Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 573.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 584-85.
[Vol. 24:89
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Furthermore, as long as the Indian tribe occupied the land, it re-
tained the possessory right to the land. Only the discovering nation, with
exclusive title to the land, could extinguish the Indian tribe's right of
occupancy. Impaired title meant that the tribe could not convey the
land. After winning its war with England, the United States took exclu-
sive title to the land and the exclusive right to deal with the Indian
tribes.34
Justice Marshall's opinion in Johnson v. McIntosh thus formulated
the relationship between the Indian tribes and the federal government.
By addressing the doctrine of discovery, basically noblesse oblige for Eu-
ropean pioneers, Marshall recognized the political status of Indian tribes.
Although the discovering nation gained exclusive title of the land
through principles based mostly on conquest, the Indians retained the
right of occupancy.
2. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
In the second case of the the Marshall Trilogy, Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia,35 Marshall formulated the idea that a trust relationship exists
between the tribes and the federal government. Marshall dispelled the
idea that the tribe constituted a foreign state; instead, he determined that
the tribes are "domestic dependent nations," while the federal govern-
ment acts as their trustee or guardian. Marshall reasoned that the rela-
tionship was a result of the United States' claim to exclusive title of tribal
land. Relying on the language of Article I of the Constitution, 6 Mar-
shall ascertained that the framers purposely distinguished Indian tribes
from foreign nations and the states.37 Stating that this situation was
unique, he characterized the tribes as wards, with the United States as
their guardian.38
3. Worcester v. Georgia
In Worcester v. Georgia,39 Marshall refined and completed the ear-
lier principles of Indian law he had developed. The outcome in Worces-
ter turned on whether the state had jurisdiction over a criminal matter
34. Id. at 591.
35. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This clause gives Congress the power to "regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes." Id.
37. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16.
38. Id. at 17.
39. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
1988]
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occurring on Indian land. In holding that Georgia was absolutely barred
from asserting jurisdiction on Indian land, Marshall delineated the basic
principles of Indian law that still exist today: broad federal powers over
Indian affairs, tribal self-government, the guardian-ward relationship,
and limited state power.
First, Marshall recognized that the Constitution granted Congress
broad powers over Indian affairs. The key provisions of the Constitution
that Marshall cited were the treaty power4° and the Indian commerce
clause.41 The states had no constitutional power to manage, regulate, or
deal with the tribes, because the plenary power doctrine makes federal
law supreme.42
Second, the Constitution, through the treaty making power and the
Indian commerce clause, acknowledges inherent tribal sovereignty. Mar-
shall noted that the tribes, though they had surrendered external govern-
mental power to the United States, had retained their right to self-
government.43 By making treaties with the tribes, Congress had recog-
nized the tribes' inherent sovereignty. 44
Third, Marshall reasoned that principles of international law recog-
nize that a weaker nation may govern its own affairs though it remains
under the dominion of the stronger nation. Marshall argued as well-set-
tled among nations that a discovery and conquest do not abolish the in-
dependence of a weaker nation.45 Rather, the stronger nation protects
the weaker nation and becomes its guardian.46 Hence, the guardian-
ward relationship is formed.
Finally, Marshall found that the states had no power over Indian
affairs. The bar on state incursions in Indian territory was absolute. To
hold otherwise, Marshall reasoned, would be inconsistent with federal
law and inherent tribal sovereignty.47
Worcester brought to fruition the basic principles of Indian law de-
veloped by Justice Marshall; however, another perspective about Indian
law also surfaced in the opinion. In his concurrence, Justice McLean
40. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
41. Id. art. I, § 8, el. 3.
42. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557-62 (1832). See Newton, supra note 30, at
199-205.
43. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 560-61.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 561-62.
[Vol. 24:89
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took a less permanent view of Indian affairs,48 stating that "[t]he exercise
of the power of self-government by the Indians, within a state, is un-
doubtedly contemplated to be temporary."'49 Justice McLean predicted
that the Indians would eventually be assimilated into white society and
that their need for self-government would wither away as they became
"amalgamated in our political communities."5 At that point, he rea-
soned, state government would take over. Although Chief Justice Mar-
shall's vision of tribal sovereignty continues to be viable,"l Justice
McLean's predictions have proven to be substantial as the courts now
balance legitimate state interests against tribal interests.5 2
B. The Roles of Tribes, States, and the Federal Government
1. The Guardian-Ward Relationship
In the trilogy, Justice Marshall established that the Indian tribes
and the federal government maintain a guardian-ward relationship.
From this relationship stemmed the idea of a trust relationship between
the government and the tribe;53 in other words, the government has a
duty to act in the best interest of the tribe.5 4
48. Id. at 563 (McLean, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 593.
50. Id.
51. See F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 231-42.
52. A line of cases follows the McLean approach of recognizing and allowing the denigration of
tribal sovereignty when it collides with the interests of mainstream society. See C. WILKINSON,
supra note 8, at 33-35.
The Supreme Court, noting that the assimilation of Indians into the general community had
turned tribal sovereignty into a floundering basis for analysis, turned to a modified approach in
examining Indian law issues in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). In Williams, the Court pro-
nounced that the test has always been "whether a state action infringed on" tribal affairs. Id. at 220.
In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978), the Court allowed further state
incursions by recognizing that "Indian tribes are prohibited from exercising ... those powers 'incon-
sistent with their status.'" (emphasis added)(quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th
Cir. 1976)). For a discussion of the Oliphant Court's departure from precedent by implying the
"doctrine of implicit departure," see Note, supra note 1, at 267-77.
53. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 295-97 (1942). The Court held the federal
government to its fiduciary duty as trustee of Indian affairs. Justice Murphy, writing the opinion,
stated:
mhis Court has recognized the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Govern-
ment in its dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited people. In carrying out
its treaty obligations with the Indian tribes, the Government is something more than a
mere contracting party. Under a humane and self imposed policy which has found expres-
sion in many acts of Congress and numerous decisions of this Court, it has charged itself
with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust. Its conduct, as disclosed in
the acts of those who represent it in dealings with the Indians, should therefore be judged
by the most exacting fiduciary standards.
Id. at 296-97 (footnotes and citations omitted).
54. The Court has interpreted congressional intent to impose a legal duty on the Executive
Branch. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton,
1988]
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From the trust duty emerged the canons of construction, rules of
construction that directed the courts to interpret treaties in favor of the
tribes.5 Because treaty negotiation more frequently tilted in favor of the
United States government, the courts, recognizing the guardian-ward re-
lationship, read the ambiguous language in these bargains to favor the
tribes.16 The canons of construction encompass three rules:5 7  (1) All
ambiguities are resolved in the tribe's favor; (2) The language of the trea-
ties or agreements is interpreted as the tribe would have understood it;
and (3) The courts construe the treaty liberally in the tribe's favor.
2. The Plenary Power of Congress
The Constitution grants Congress broad plenary powers to regulate
Indian tribes." Congress derives power from the trust relationship also,
because of its fiduciary duty to Indian tribes.5 9 With this plenary power
arises the power to abrogate treaties60 and take tribal land.61 Courts, in
accordance with the canons of construction, seek to determine congres-
sional intent by examining the language of the statute or its legislative
354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962
(1975). Cf. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). In Lone Wolf the Court stated that
Congress has "a moral obligation... to act in good faith in performing the stipulations entered into
on its behalf." Id. at 566.
55. See F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 222. See also FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at
214-17.
56. Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: 'As Long as Water
Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth'--How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 601, 608-19
(1975).
57. Id.
58. See Newton, supra note 30, at 195-98. The Indian commerce clause grants Congress the
exclusive power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The
treaty clause grants the federal government exclusive power to enter into treaties. U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, cl. 2. However, Congress ended treaty-making with Indian tribes by statute in 1871. The
property clause grants to Congress the power to regulate and dispose of public lands. U.S. CONsT.
art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The supremacy clause makes federal treaties and statutes the supreme law of the
land. U.S. CONsr. art. VI, cl. 2. The necessary and proper clause granis Congress broad authority
to enumerate its powers. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Finally, although no longer relevant in this
area, the war powers clause grants power to Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
59. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28
(1913). The trust relationship has not been cited by the Court as a separate source of power since
1926. See generally Newton, supra note 30.
60. See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968); United States v. Win-
nebago Tribe of Nebraska, 542 F.2d 1002, 1004 (8th Cir. 1976). But see Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,
187 U.S. 553 (1903) and Seneca Nation of Indians v. Brucker, 262 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 909 (1959). In Lone Wolf the Court articulated the plenary authority of Congress
to abrogate treaties, but it found that Congress' duty to the Indians was no different than that ex-
tended to other nations. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566. See generally Wilkinson & Volkman, supra
note 56.
61. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980); Shoshone Tribe v. United
States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937).
8
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history. 2 When congressional intent is not apparent, courts generally
resolve ambiguities in favor of the tribe, as prescribed by the canons of
construction.63
Congress can limit a tribe's governmental powers to the point of
termination, but, unless congressional intent to do so is certain, a pre-
sumption exists that the tribe maintains governing ability by virtue of its
inherent sovereignty."4 Felix Cohen, the eminent Indian law scholar, 5
identified many characteristics of self-government, including the power
to choose a form of government, set membership rules and obligations,
delineate the conditions of inheritance, regulate property, levy taxes, and
administer justice. 6 When determining the extent of tribal sovereignty,
courts should, according to Cohen, start with the presumption that the
tribe "possesses ... all the powers of any sovereign state. ' 67 Courts must
then search for "express legislation" to determine the scope of the tribe's
right of self-government.6 ' Therefore, Cohen maintained that, unless
Congress expressly qualified certain tribal rights, the full power of inter-
nal sovereignty "vested in the Indian tribes and in their duly constituted
organs of government. '69
3. State Interests: Formation of the Balancing Test
Worcester v. Georgia70 established the principle that states could
not assert their powers in Indian territory;71 however, a crack in the
"Worcester wall,"72 imposed fifty-one years after the decision, evolved
into a balancing test. In United States v. McBratney,73 the Supreme
Court upheld state prosecution of a white defendant who had murdered
62. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 241, reh'g denied, 471 U.S. 1062
(1985). See generally F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 221-25.
63. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676
(9th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976). Cf. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S.
425, 444, reh'g denied, 421 U.S. 939 (1975).
64. See Wilkinson & Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REv.
139 (1977); F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LA\v 122-23 (1942).
65. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2 at xxx.
66. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at 276-77.
67. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at 277.
68. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at 278. See Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423
(1971). The Court held, per curiam, that, even though the tribe consented to state jurisdiction
through tribal agreement, "[t]he unilateral action of the Tribal Council was insufficient to vest Mon-
tana with jurisdiction over Indian country .... " Id. at 427.
69. F. COHEN, supra note 64, at 123.
70. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
71. Id. at 53742.
72. See Comment, The Developing Test for State Regulatory Jurisdiction in Indian Country:
Application in the Context of Environmental Law, 61 OR. L. REv. 561, 565 (1982).
73. 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
1988]
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another white within the Ute Reservation in Colorado. The Court rea-
soned that, once Colorado was admitted into the Union, the state ac-
quired exclusive criminal jurisdiction over the entire territory and its
citizens-including the Ute Reservation.74
The decision diverged from the reasoning of Worcester. In his opin-
ion in McBratney, Justice Gray concluded that federal jurisdiction ap-
plied only to the enforcement of treaty provisions.75 He found "no
stipulation for the punishment of offences committed by white men
against white men" in the provisions.76 However, as one scholar insists,
the McBratney decision and its progeny77 departed entirely from federal
law. 78
The seminal case which acknowledged, at least the possibility of
state incursions into Indian country was Williams v. Lee.79 In Williams,
a non-Indian who owned a store on an Indian reservation sought to sue
an Indian couple in state court for money they owed him. 0 The
Supreme Court determined that state jurisdiction would undermine tri-
bal authority to adjudicate reservation affairs, thus infringing on tribal
self-government.8 " The Court formulated a test for determining whether
74. Id. at 624.
75. Id. See also Clinton, supra note 1, at 525.
76. McBratney, 104 U.S. at 624.
77. The McBratney trilogy also includes Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896) and New
York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946). In Draper, the Supreme Court decided, despite
Montana's Enabling Act disclaiming any right to criminal jurisdiction, that statehood gave the state
authority to prosecute a crime involving two non-Indians on Indian land. In Martin, the Supreme
Court upheld New York's conviction of a non-Indian for the murder of a non-Indian within Indian
land.
78. See Clinton, supra note 1, at 526 n.103. Highly critical of the McBratney approach, Clin-
ton argues:
McBratney and its progeny, in ignoring the language of [18 U.S.C § 1152] and its prede-
cessors which purport to grant exclusive federal jurisdiction over crimes committed be-
tween non-Indians on Indian lands, circumvents the constitutional supremacy clause and
preemption issues raised by the simultaneous exercise of section 1152 jurisdiction and the
exercise of state jurisdiction. Even if state sovereignty vests the states with some jurisdic-
tion over non-Indian crimes committed on Indian lands, it is a derogation of federal au-
thority to hold that the federal courts do not even have concurrent jurisdiction over such
crimes despite the clear language of section 1152. The Court sub silentio suggests that
Congress has no power to create either exclusive or concurrent federal jurisdiction over
non-Indian crimes occurring on Indian lands which, at best, is a questionable proposition.
Id. Section 1152, designated the Indian Country Crimes Act, (also called the General Crimes Act,
the Interracial Crime Provision, and the Federal Enclave Statute) addressed federal jurisdiction
solely, not state jurisdiction. It originated with the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790. See FED-
ERAL INDiAN LAW, supra note 2, at 397.
79. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
80. Id. at 217-18.
81. Id. at 220.
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a state incursion into tribal sovereignty is barred, the Williams infringe-
ment test. This examination provides: "Essentially, absent governing
Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action
infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and
be ruled by them.",82
Although it reaffirmed the Worcester doctrine83 and set a tone of
resistance to state intrusion into Indian affairs,84 the Williams infringe-
ment test nonetheless conceded that states can have legitimate interests
in regulating certain matters - in this case, matters involving non-Indi-
ans within Indian country." The Williams infringement test left many
questions tentative.86 Consequently, subsequent court decisions have ap-
plied the test inconsistently.87
In the early seventies, the Supreme Court adopted a new phase of
Indian law analysis. The Court noted the "considerable evolution" of
the Worcester doctrine in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commis-
sion.88 In an opinion reminiscent of Justice McClean's predictions, Jus-
tice Thurgood Marshall noted that Indian sovereignty had been
"adjusted" to accommodate the state's "legitimate interests in regulating
the affairs of non-Indians. ' 89 Assuming that the importance of the bar-
rier of Indian sovereignty to state incursions had eroded, Justice Mar-
shall identified a "modern" basis for limiting state power: federal
preemption.90
While avowing that a state may have a legitimate interest in regula-
tion, the McClanahan Court shifted from the traditional focus on tribal
sovereignty to the doctrine of preemption.9" In other words, the
Supreme Court determined that the counterbalancing of state and tribal
interests rests on federal law instead of "platonic notions of Indian sover-
eignty."92 Therefore, if a court ascertains federal involvement or regula-
tion, state incursions are prohibited.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 221.
84. Id. at 221-22.
85. Id. at 220-21.
86. See Clinton, supra note 9, at 438-39; Comment, supra note 72, at 566-68.
87. Decisions which have allowed a greater degree of state power over Indian affairs off-reser-
vation include Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962). Decisions which have more
closely adhered to the traditional preemption approach toward state incursions include Warren
Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
88. 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973).
89. Id. at 171.
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In McClanahan, the Supreme Court reduced tribal sovereignty to a
"backdrop" weighted by the canons of construction.93 Justice Marshall
reasoned that lower courts had placed less emphasis on inherent sover-
eignty, which signified a conceived decrease in tribal sovereignty. None-
theless, because the Court turned the analysis to federal preemption,
tribal self-government would not be undermined so readily. McClana-
han and its companion case, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,9a clearly
established that "absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes
permitting it, there has been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian
reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried on within the
boundaries of the reservation ... ,"I This principle was reiterated later
by the Supreme Court in Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes.96
However, the "test" lacks precision because, unlike the absolute bar
to state incursions established in Worcester, it requires the weighing of
interests. For example, following McClanahan, the Court held, in Wash-
ington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 97 that
"tribal sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal
Government, not the States." 98 Nevertheless, the court allowed state
taxation of Indians who were not enrolled tribal members. 99 Moreover,
consistent with Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 100 the
Court upheld state record-keeping requirements imposed on the tribe.
Justice White contended, "We recognized in Moe that if a State's tax is
valid, the State may impose at least minimal burdens on Indian busi-
nesses to aid in collecting aud enforcing that tax."'0
The Court delineated a two-prong test in White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Bracker1° for determining whether state power is barred in In-
dian Country. The test, which focuses on federal preemption and in-
fringement on tribal sovereignty,10 3 prompts "a particularized inquiry
into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake .... "I'
While these cases have not proven deleterious to the core of tribal
93. Id. at 174.
94. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
95. Id. at 148.
96. 425 U.S. 463, 475-76 (1976).
97. 447 U.S. 134, rehg denied, 448 U.S. 911 (1980).
98. Id. at 154.
99. Id. at 159.
100. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
101. Washington, 447 U.S. at 159.
102. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
103. Id. at 142.
104. Id. at 145.
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self-government established in the Marshall trilogy, the fact that the test
now requires a balancing of competing interests, leaves room for incon-
sistent results. Perhaps the most extreme example is Rice v. Rehner,05 in
which the Supreme Court fashioned a different approach to balancing the
interests of tribes and states.
The Rice Court based its decision on the fact that tribes had not
traditionally regulated liquor sales.' 6 The Court rejected the argument
that " 'independent [tribal] authority is itself sufficient for the tribes to
impose' their own liquor regulations."' 107 Moreover, the Court deter-
mined that the McClanahan "backdrop of tribal sovereignty" analysis
was inappropriate when applied to the facts in Rice.'08 Justice
O'Connor, writing for the Court, stated, "If, however, we do not find
such a tradition, or if we determine that the balance of state, federal, and
tribal interests so requires, our pre-emption analysis may accord less
weight to the 'backdrop' of tribal sovereignty."'0 9
In a recent decision, California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indi-
ans,"' the Supreme Court gave little credence to the "traditional activ-
ity" analysis. The Court focused instead on federal intent to promote
tribal sovereignty."' In weighing legitimate state interests "in light of
the compelling federal and tribal interests," the Court determined that
state regulation of tribal bingo games, even though traditionally not a
tribal activity, "would impermissibly infringe on tribal self-
government." 1 1
2
III. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY
A clear formula for resolving criminal jurisdictional issues on Indian
land does not exist. Many factors affect it: the type of crime, the defend-
ant's race, and the victim's race. Basically, federal courts have jurisdic-
tion over major crimes, while the tribes maintain jurisdiction over other
areas, mainly misdemeanors and civil regulatory crimes. Omnipresent is
105. 463 U.S. 713, reh'g denied, 464 U.S. 874 (1983).
106. Id. at 723-25.
107. Id. at 722 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)).
108. Id. at 725.
109. Id. at 720.
110. 480 U.S. 202, 107 S. Ct. 1083 (1987).
111. Id. at -, 107 S. Ct. at 1094-95.
112. Id. at-, 107 S. Ct. at 1093-95. See Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla.
Tax Comm'n, 829 F.2d 967, 982 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2870 (1988), which relies
on Cabazon in preempting state regulation of a Creek bingo enterprise.
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Congress' power to completely abolish tribal courts and grant jurisdic-
tion to the states. However, criminal jurisdiction in Indian country has
proceeded along a spectrum, beginning with exclusive tribal jurisdiction.
A. Early Decisions
Worcester, which denied the intrusion of state criminal jurisdiction
in Indian territory, formed the basis of tribal self-government that lasted
for half a century. Although the McBratney decision marked the begin-
ning of the end for the Worcester wall with respect to non-Indians in
Indian Country, other decisions upheld tribal sovereignty, sometimes to
the dismay of Congress.113
The Supreme Court held in Ex Parte Crow Dog," 4 an 1883 decision,
that Indian tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over the prosecution of an
Indian for the murder of another Indian on Indian land." 5 The Court
predicated its opinion on the principle established by the Marshall trilogy
that the tribes had inherent sovereignty to govern their own affairs.
Thus, the Court, looking to several congressional acts, reasoned that
Congress intended for the tribes to regulate, maintain, and administer
their own affairs.' 16
B. Congressional Enactments Limiting Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction
In response to the Crow Dog decision, Congress enacted the Major
Crimes Act of 1885,11' which limited tribal criminal jurisdiction by
granting exclusive federal jurisdiction over certain crimes.' 8 From the
113. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
114. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
115. Id. at 571-72.
116. Id. at 570-72.
117. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1982).
118. The Act has since been amended. The revised statute states:
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other
person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnaping, maiming,
rape, involuntary sodomy, felonious sexual molestation of a minor, carnal knowledge of
any female not his wife, who has not attained the age of sixteen years, assault with intent to
commit rape, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous
weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony
under section 661 of this title within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same law
and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the United States.
(b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is not defined and pun-
ished by Federal law in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States shall be
defined and punished in accordance with the laws of the State in which such offense was
committed as are in force at the time of such offense.
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1982), as amended by Pub. L. 99-646 § 87(c)(5), 100 Stat. 3623 (1986).
[Vol. 24:89
14
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 24 [1988], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol24/iss1/4
1988] TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
Major Crimes Act precipitated many other statutes delineating provi-
sions and conditions directed at criminal jurisdiction on Indian land.119
The more salient of these enactments include the Indian Country
Crimes Act, 20 which established exclusive federal jurisdiction in Indian
country. It thus preempted states from asserting jurisdiction over crimi-
nal matters on Indian land. The Assimilative Crimes Act 12 1 transcribed
state criminal violations into federal law, filling gaps that the more gen-
eral Indian Country Crimes Act left. 122 Public Law 280, adopted during
an era of federal policy promoting the termination of tribal self-govern-
ment,1 23 implemented state criminal jurisdiction on Indian reservations
in six states.124 Ten states opted for jurisdiction, 2  but with the rise of
civil rights throughout the United States in the 1960's, so came changes
in Indian policy. The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 amended Public
Law 280 by requiring tribal consent to state jurisdiction.126 Moreover,
many states retroceded jurisdiction to the federal government.' 27
C. Current Policies
From a starting point of absolute Indian jurisdiction over criminal
119. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at 396-97.
120. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1982). The statute states:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United States
as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall extend to the In-
dian country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person
or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian
country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty
stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian
tribes respectively.
Id.
121. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1982).
122. F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 290.
123. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at 130-51.
124. Initially, PL-280, adopted in 1953, granted jurisdiction to five states: California, Minne-
sota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Jurisdiction was later conferred on Alaska. The statute
provided:
Each of the States or Territories... shall have jurisdiction over offenses committed by
or against Indians in the areas of Indian country listed opposite the name of the State or
Territory to the same extent that such State or Territory has jurisdiction over offenses
committed elsewhere within the State or Territory, and the criminal laws of such State or
Territory shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have
elsewhere within the State or Territory.
18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1982). See F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 362-80; Clinton, supra note 1, at 548-
52; Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 535 (1975).
125. See F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 362-63 n.125.
126. F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 363 n.126.
127. F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 363 n.129.
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matters within Indian country, criminal jurisdiction in Indian matters
has evolved into a complicated scheme.128 Generally, several established
concepts apply:' 29 (1) States cannot assume jurisdiction if a crime be-
tween an Indian defendant and an Indian victim occurs in Indian Coun-
try;" ° (2) Indian courts have jurisdiction over non-major crimes
between Indians and over victimless crimes by Indians;"3 (3) States do
not have jurisdiction over interracial crimes in Indian country; 132
(4) Tribal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over non-major crimes and
crimes committed by an Indian against a non-Indian; otherwise, federal
courts have exclusive jurisidiction; 133 and (5) States have jurisdiction,
according to the McBratney doctrine, for crimes in Indian country be-
tween non-Indians.1 34 Jurisdictional authority over areas involving vic-
timless and consensual crimes, whether committed by Indians or non-
Indians, is still questionable. 13
5
D. Criminal Jurisdiction in Oklahoma
For many years courts assumed that provisions in the Allotment
Act 136 and the special status of Oklahoma as Indian Territory before
128. For more complete and exhaustive studies of criminal jurisdiction, see F. COHEN, supra
note 14, at ch. 6; FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at 412-13. The authors Of FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW provide a "map" through the maze. The questions suggested by the authors for initial analysis
are:
1. Was the Locus of the Crime in Indian country?
2. Does "Public Law 280" or a Specific Jurisdictional Statute Apply?
3. Was the Crime Committed by or Against an Indian?
4. Which Defendant-Victim Category Applies?
a. Crime by an Indian against an Indian
b. Crime by an Indian against a non-Indian
c. Crime by a non-Indian against an Indian
d. Crime by a non-Indian against a non-Indian
e. "Victimless" and "consensual" crimes by an Indian
f. "Victimless" and "consensual" crimes by a non-Indian.
Id. at 412-13. See also Clinton, supra note 1; Vollmann, supra note 23.
129. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at 414-15. See generally W. CANaY, AMERICAN
INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL ch. 7 (1988).
130. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at 414.
131. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at 414.
132. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at 414.
133. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at 414.
134. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at 415.
135. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at 415.
136. For a thorough account of criminal jurisdiction of the Five Civilized Tribes in Oklahoma,
see Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd sub nora, Harjo v. Andrus, 581 F.2d
949 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See generally FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at 111-20; A. DEBo, AND
STILL THE WATERS RUN (1984); F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 770-97.
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statehood in 1907137 gave Oklahoma jurisdiction over Indian lands. In-
terpretations by the state attorney general and the justice department
concluding that the statutes and Oklahoma Enabling Act138 conferred
jurisdiction upon Oklahoma have been rejected by both federal and state
courts. The courts, sometimes relying on the canons of construction,
have found nothing in the statutes indicating that Congress clearly in-
tended to transfer criminal jurisdiction to the state.
1. The Evolution of Indian Jurisdiction in Oklahoma
While the Marshall trilogy established that Indian tribes retained
the right of occupancy to the lands on which they lived, the consensus
among those debating Indian policy supported the view that the Indians
should move west. 139 Upon the passage of several treaties beginning in
1830,1° tribes occupying the southeastern states began their hegira to
unoccupied land, which now constitutes Oklahoma, Kansas, and Arkan-
sas. 141 The first tribes removed were called the Five Civilized Tribes, and
they occupied much of what is now Oklahoma.142 Although removal
treaties provided that the land would always belong to the tribes, settlers
gradually consumed the mass of acreage. 14
3
One of the greatest reductions in Indian land holdings occurred af-
ter the Civil War. Congress punished the Five Civilized Tribes, many
members of which had supported the Confederacy, by forcing them to
cede their western holdings."4 The Oklahoma Territory Organic Act, 4 '
passed in 1890, created Oklahoma Territory in the western part of the
state, pushing the Five Civilized Tribes and the Quapaw Agency Tribes
into the eastern portion of their territory.'46 Despite the changes in land
possession, tribal authority and federal jurisdiction in both territories
137. Kickingbird, supra note 14, at 4-5.
138. Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267, 267-278.
139. The land-hungry wanted Indian tribes to leave for obvious reasons; however, the "friends"
of the Indians felt that Indian culture and well-being would be best served if the tribes were insulated
from Anglo culture. Even some tribal leaders conceded that, to avoid annihilation, pressing on was
the best option. DEBO, supra note 136, at 31-91.
140. F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 771 nn.6-8.
141. F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 771.
142. Referred to as the the Five Civilized Tribes, the Choctaws, Chickasaws, Creeks, Cherokees,
and Seminoles, were the first tribes to inhabit Oklahoma. F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 771. For a
history of these tribes, see DEBO, supra note 136 and R. STRICKLAND, THE INDIANS IN OKLAHOMA
(1980).
143. F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 772-73.
144. See State ex reL May v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe, 711 P.2d 77, 81 n.16 (Okla. 1985).
145. Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, 26 Stat. 81.
146. F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 773.
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were retained.147
Meanwhile, the arguments that Indian lands should be opened up to
settlers and that the Indians should be assimilated into white culture
gained considerable momentum in Congress.148 The General Allotment
Act of 1887 '49 initiated the breakup of tribal lands, but the Five Civilized
Tribes were exempted from implementation, at least temporarily.1 50 The
Curtis Act of June 28, 1898151 compelled the tribes to participate in the
allotment process.15 2 As a result of the allotment acts, nearly 90 million
acres nationwide of tribal land were lost.' 53 The Curtis Act also abol-
ished tribal court systems, but not the tribes' governments.1 5 4
2. A Matter of Interpretation
The jurisdictional disputes that have confronted state and federal
courts center on whether Congress transferred federal criminal jurisdic-
tion to Oklahoma upon statehood in 1907. Three acts passed between
1897 and 1907 pertain to allotted Indian land. The federal courts have
taken a different view as to the effect of the acts than that held by the
Oklahoma Attorney General. 5 Meanwhile, the United States Depart-
ment of Justice has supported the state's position.156
Basically, the state maintains that three congressional enactments,
when taken together, abolished the tribal status of the Five Civilized
Tribes. As a result, Oklahoma assumed criminal jurisdiction over
nonfederal crimes when it became a state. These statutes are the Appro-
priations Act of June 7, 1897, the Curtis Act of 1898, and the Amend-
ment to the Oklahoma Enabling Act of 1907.157
The attorney general based his reasoning in part on a 1936
Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals opinion, Ex parte Nowabbi.158 In
Nowabbi, the court determined that the state had jurisdiction over the
147. F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 773.
148. See R. STRICKLAND, supra note 142, at 36-39.
149. Act of February 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 331
(1982)). This act was also referred to as "The Dawes Act."
150. Id. § 8, 24 Stat. 391 § 1 (codified as amended 25 U.S.C. § 339 (1982)).
151. Act of June 28, 1898, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495.
152. F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 774.
153. C. WILKINSON, supra note 8, at 8.
154. See Kickingbird, supra note 14, at 16-17.
155. 79 Op. Att'y Gen. 216 (1979).
156. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the United States Dept. of Justice, Oklahoma v. Brooks, No. S-
85-117 (Okla. Crim. App. Oct. 14, 1988).
157. Tyner v. Okla., No. 87-C-29-E, slip op. at 12 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 29, 1987).
158. 60 Okla. Crim. 111, 61 P.2d 1139 (1936).
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prosecution of one Indian for the murder of another Indian on a re-
stricted allotment.159 Both the defendant and the victim were members
of the Choctaw Tribe.1" At the time of the opinion, the Indian Country
Crimes Act granted exclusive federal jurisdiction over interracial crimes.
In addition, the Indian Territory Major Crimes Act granted exclusive
federal jurisdiction over Indians accused of murder on a reservation.
The court, in determining whether the restricted allotment was tanta-
mount to a diminished reservation, decided that it was not.61 In reach-
ing its holding, the criminal court of appeals focused on an amendment
to the General Allotment Act of 1906 which precluded Indian country
jurisdiction in what is now eastern Oklahoma.162 Thus, the court con-
cluded that federal jurisdiction was precluded in Indian territory. 63
In 1948, Congress revised the Indian Country Crimes Act, expressly
extending federal jurisdiction to restricted allotments. 16  Nowabbi has
since been criticized for having unsound and dubious reasoning 165 and
has been rejected by the federal courts and the Oklahoma Supreme
Court. 166 However, Cohen noted that "the issue will remain uncertain
until resolved by an authoritative judicial decision or congressional
action." 16 7
In addition to the opinion by the Oklahoma Attorney General, a
1942 administrative opinion 16 has also been relied on by those arguing
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1143.
161. Id. at 1154.
162. Id. at 1147.
163. Id.
164. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151-53, 3242 (1982).
165. See F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 777-79.
166. See, eg., Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 829 F.2d
967 (10th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 2870 (1988). In State ex rel. May v. Seneca-Cayuga
Tribe, 711 P.2d 77, 81 n.17 (Okla. 1985), the Oklahoma Supreme Court notes:
Ex parte NowabbL.. holding that Oklahoma could take jurisdiction over crimes commit-
ted by Indians in Indian Country, on which the Attorney's General Opinion relies, is based
on pre-1948 law. The 1948 revised United States Code includes revisions found at 18
U.S.C. § 1151 (defining Indian Country) and § 1153 (The Major Crimes Act vesting juris-
diction in the United States for major crimes .... ). Since enactment of the 1948 code,
courts have been reluctant to exclude the lands of eastern Oklahoma tribes from applica-
tion of federal law.
Id.
167. F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 779.
168. Letter from Ass't Secretary of the Interior to the Attorney General of Oklahoma, "Jurisdic-
tion-State and Federal Courts-Restricted Allotments in Former Oklahoma Territory" (Aug. 17,
1942), cited in F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 779 n.85.
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that the state assumed jurisdiction over its eastern territory upon state-
hood. The author of the 1942 opinion maintained that the Appropria-
tions Act of June 7, 1897 "implicitly superseded" the Indian country
statutes in Indian territory by mandating the application of federal and
Arkansas laws in Indian Territory "regardless of race." 169 The Indian
country statutes expressly addressed race. As a result of the difference in
language, the reasoning goes, the Indian country laws were implicitly
superseded by the Appropriations Act. Therefore, Oklahoma assumed
jurisdiction over those matters reached by Arkansas law. 17 0 Nonetheless,
the opinion suggested that Congress should resolve this "uncertain"
dilemma. 1
71
The state has argued that the Appropriations Act dissolved the gov-
ernments of the Five Civilized Tribes. Hence, the state assumed jurisdic-
tion over Indian lands. The administrative opinion relies, then, on the
idea that the Five Civilized Tribes were extinguished. Even though the
Enabling Act expressly reserved federal authority over Indian lands, the
five tribes were not included, according to the state's argument. Instead,
the state maintains that a section of its Enabling Act indicates "congres-
sional intent to grant Oklahoma broad jurisdiction over Indian lands." 7 '
Dissolution was never realized. The Five Tribes Act of 1906 pro-
vided that "the tribal existence and present tribal governments of the
Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole tribes or nations
are hereby continued in full force and effect for all purposes authorized
by law."17 The Tenth Circuit recently ascertained that section one of
the Enabling Act dispelled the state's notion that it gained jurisdictional
interests. In Indian Country, U.S.A. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax
Commission, 7 4 the court indicated that the state had "completely ig-
nore[d]" a section of the Oklahoma Enabling Act,17 1 which expressly re-
tained federal jurisdiction. 176 The court concluded that the Act's
169. F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 779 n.85.
170. F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 779.
171. F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 779 n.85.
172. Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 829 F.2d 967, 979
(10th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 2870 (1988).
173. The Five Tribes Act of 1906, ch. 1876, § 28, 34 Stat. 137, 148.
174. 829 F.2d 967, 978 (10th Cir. 1987), cerL denied, 108 S. Ct. 2870 (1988).
175. Oklahoma Enabling Act, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267 (1906).
176. See Indian Country, US.A., 829 F.2d at 979. Section one of the act, which the court cites,
provides:
[Nothing contained in the said constitution shall be construed to limit or impair the rights
of person or property pertaining to the Indians of said Territories (so long as such rights
shall remain unextinguished) or to limit or affect the authority of the Government of the
United States to make any law or regulation respecting such Indians, their lands, property,
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language showed a congressional intent to retain "jurisdiction and au-
thority over Indians and their lands in the new State of Oklahoma until it
accomplished the eventual goal of terminating the tribal governments,
assimilating the Indians, and dissolving completely the tribally-owned
land base-events that never occurred and goals that Congress later ex-
pressly repudiated." '177
The validity of the state's position is further shaken by federal acts
extolling tribal self-determination.178 The 1948 revision of the Indian
country statutes expressly favored federal jurisdiction. As one author
has noted, recent Supreme Court decisions, when taken together, contain
a message of permanency when addressing tribalism. 79 In other words,
regardless of federal recognition, tribal members determine the existence
of tribal government. Finally, judicial precedent has always rung clear:
dissolution does not occur absent clear congressional intent.180 There-
fore, an "implicit" superseding of federal statutes with state law and the
abolishment of the tribal governments in eastern Oklahoma are unlikely.
3. Application of the Balancing Test
Even though the federal courts and the Oklahoma Supreme Court
have upheld the position that the Indian allotments in eastern Oklahoma
constitute Indian country, the state supreme court took an interesting
approach recently in finding that the state could regulate a bingo opera-
tion on Indian land to the extent that it affected non-members of the
tribe. In State ex rel. May v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe,18' the court, after
determining that an Indian allotment fell within the meaning of Indian
or other rights by treaties, agreement, law or otherwise, which it would have been compe-
tent to make if this Act had never been passed.
Id.
Oklahoma relies on section three of the act, which provides
[t]hat the people inhabiting said proposed State do agree and declare that they forever
disclaim all right and title in or to any unappropriated public lands lying within the bound-
aries thereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian, tribe, or
nation; and that until the title to any such public land shall have been extinguished by the
United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the jurisdiction, disposal, and con-
trol of the United States.
Id.
177. Id.
178. See eg., Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, Act of June 26, 1936, ch. 831, 49 Stat. 1967 (codi-
fied as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 501-09 (1982)); Message from the President of the United States
Transmitting Recommendations for Indian Policy, H.R. Doc. No. 363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970),
reprinted in FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at 151-53. See also Kickingbird, supra note 14, at
17.
179. C. WILKINSON, supra note 8, at 77.
180. See supra notes 70-112 and accompanying text.
181. 711 P.2d 77 (Okla. 1985).
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country under 18 U.S.C. section 1151(c), found that nothing barred it
from conducting a test balancing the interests involved.182 It remanded
the case to the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the
extent to which the activity would affect non-members of the self-gov-
erning unit. 18 3
Ultimately, however, the federal district court enjoined the state dis-
trict court from proceeding, holding that the decision was contrary to
federal policy, which encourages tribal self-government and economic
growth.184 The federal district court criticized the state's highest court
for conducting a one-sided balancing test.18 Although Supreme Court
decisions have recognized that a state may have an interest in regulating
tribal activity, tribal interests in self-government are not lightly consid-
ered.186 The Court critically scrutinizes state incursions into Indian af-
fairs, but the opportunity to perform a balancing test of interests invites
time-consuming and expensive litigation.
4. Jurisdiction as a Result of Public Pressure
Governmental policies are a barometer of public temperament. The
very reason that Indians were coerced into leaving their homelands for
Oklahoma was to appease the land-greedy. The allotment era placated
those who thought that the Indian people must be assimilated into white
culture. When the allotment process proved disasterous, policy changed.
The termination era followed World War II, when a policy of conformity
acted as a bellwether.18 ' Then, the American Civil Rights movement
propelled a shift in policy once again. President Nixon pronounced in a
182. The court found that Public Law 83-280, a 1953 congressional enactment that permitted
states to invoke certain civil and criminal jurisdiction, did not preclude the state from assuming
jurisdiction over a civil regulatory matter even though Oklahoma had never adopted the statute. Id.
at 85-88.
PL 83-280 allowed states to rescind constitutional provisions disclaiming title to Indian lands to
Indian tribes; to be admitted to the United States, territories had to include these provisions in their
constitutions. PL 83-280 transferred federal civil and criminal jurisdiction to the state, and assump-
tion of PL 83-280 required affirmative legislative action and removal of the disclaimer. In 1968,
Congress amended the statute to require tribal consent. Unless the statute has been adopted, con-
gressional authority to assert jurisdiction is absent. See Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Okla., v. Oklahoma,
No. 85-C-639-B (consolidated with 86-C-393-B) slip op. at 7-13 (N.D. Okla. June 5, 1987).
183. May, 711 P.2d at 92.
184. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Okla. v. Oklahoma, No. 85-C-639 (consolidated with 86-C-393-B)
slip op. at 21 (N.D. Okla. June 5, 1987).
185. Id.
186. See, eg., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987); Mescalaro
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973); Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla.
Tax Comm'n, 829 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2870 (1988).
187. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at 130-51.
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message to Congress that "[t]he time has come to break decisively with
the past and to create the conditions for a new era in which the Indian
future is determined by Indian acts and Indian decisions."'1 88
Recently, a federal district court held that Oklahoma could not ex-
ercise criminal jurisdiction over a restricted Indian allotment on which a
bingo hall was operated. 189 The Tulsa County District Attorney inter-
preted the ruling as prohibiting all state law enforcement on Indian
lands."19 Approximately 200 tracts of Indian land lie in Tulsa County, 191
and law enforcement officials have been nonplussed over these admoni-
tions and allotment maps.' 92 Indian citizens have obviously been
concerned. 193
IV. PROPOSED CHANGES: THE USE OF AGREEMENTS IN
RESOLVING CRIMINAL JURISDICTION DISPUTES
Confronted with the loss of time, money, and court battles, some
states and tribes have turned to negotiated agreements which, after ap-
proval by Congress, have developed into lucrative and amicable ventures.
The Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act is one example. Many authori-
ties have expressed the view that present criminal jurisdiction disputes in
Oklahoma would be best resolved in a similar manner. 194
A. Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act
In 1976, a federal district court decision cleared the way for the
unrecognized tribes to pursue their claims to as much as two hundred
thousand acres of land, ten million dollars, and federal benefits. 195 Reac-
tions to the opinion ranged from enthusiasm to confusion to hatred. On
one hand, the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot tribes were realizing their
188. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 2, at 152.
189. Tyner v. Oklahoma, No. 87-C-29-E, slip op. (N.D. Okla. Oct. 29, 1987).
190. Kimbrell, Sheriffto Ignore Calls From Indian Land, Tulsa World, Dec. 2, 1987, at Al, col.
1.
191. Robertson, Indian sovereignty issue has officials scratching heads, Tulsa Tribune, Dec. 3,
1987, at A4, col. 3.
192. Kimbrell, Indian Land Map Confuses Sheriff, District Attorney, Tulsa World, Dec. 10,
1987, at El, col. 1.
193. Kimbrell, Area Indians Call Response To Court Decision "Dumb," Tulsa World, Dec. 3,
1987, at Al, col. 3. Nelson Johnson, the owner of Creek Nation Bingo hall, summarized the situa-
tion, as he saw it: "[The district attorney] isn't dealing with us as a sovereign [nation], he's dealing
with us as opponents." Id.
194. See infra notes 210-21 and accompanying text.
195. Restitution, supra note 21, at 99.
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existence as self-governing entities with cognizable rights;19 6 on the other
hand, some citizens, corporations, and politicians in Maine were shocked
by what they viewed as Indian blackmail. 97 With violence threatened
and political upheaval expected, the parties soon recognized that a nego-
tiated agreement was the best alternative. 198
The crux of the agreement was that each party gave up certain
rights and retained others. For example, the tribes agreed to the state
exercising criminal and regulatory jurisdiction on their reservations. 199
They dropped all of their land claims (to approximately twelve and a half
million acres) in return for appropriations from the state and the federal
government."z° Three hundred thousand acres of average quality timber-
land was restored to the reservation with an option to buy two hundred
thousand acres at fair market value. The tribes also agreed that individ-
ual members who lived and worked on the reservations would pay state
income tax. 01 The state conceded the right to regulate most hunting and
fishing to the tribes, 02 and it left the tribes with the right to prosecute
misdemeanors in tribal courts.20 3 The tribes also received full recogni-
tion by Congress and 81.5 million dollars in appropriations." 4 The final
stage of the agreement, the Maine Implementing Act,20 5 was passed by
the Maine legislature and senate after two days of debate.20 6 The act was
196. In noting that many tribes across the nation were being revitalized through the court sys-
tem during the 1970's, Thomas Tureen, attorney for the Passamaquoddies, explained the scenario as
follows:
The point is that all this legal activity served to make jurisdiction a central issue for Indians
across the nation, so that by the time negotiations began in the Maine Indian-land-claim
case, in the spring of 1978, the leaders of the Passamaquoddies and the Penobscots were
determined to obtain full federal status for their tribes. The trouble was that this placed
them on a collision course with the State of Maine, which, for a hundred and sixty years,
had felt that the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Penobscot Nation had no inherent sover-
eign powers, and that Indians could exercise only those powers which the state saw fit to
grant them.
Restitution, supra note 21, at 127.
197. Restitution, supra note 21, at 106.
198. Restitution, supra note 21, at 110-37.
199. Restitution, supra note 21, at 139.
200. Restitution, supra note 21, at 113. Under the terms of the agreement, Maine appropriated
$1,700,000 a year for fifteen years. Id. The federal government appropriated $81,500,000 which was
deposited in a trust on Dec. 12, 1980. Id. at 144.
201. Restitution, supra note 21, at 144.
202. Restitution, supra note 21, at 144.
203. Restitution, supra note 21, at 144.
204. Restitution, supra note 21, at 144.
205. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §§ 6201-02 (Supp. 1987).
206. Restitution, supra note 21, at 140. Even though the agreement was touted as "a good com-
promise that will make a new era in which the Indians of this state can live in dignity," it neverthe-
less prompted scowls from a few. One editorial admonished lawmakers to "not allow themselves to
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then sent to Congress, which ratified it about six months later.2 °7 The
tribes have since flourished, increasing their land holdings and building
business enterprises. For example, the Passamaquoddies now own the
largest independent blueberry operation in the state.2"8 Congress has rat-
ified similar claims settlement acts with other tribes.209
B. Agreements Solving Criminal Jurisdiction Disputes in Eastern
Oklahoma
Agreements between the state and tribes, authorized by Congress,
are a plausible and sensible means of resolving the criminal jurisdiction
disputes in Oklahoma. Criminal cases are generally narrow in scope, so
court decisions continue to leave many issues unanswered. Conse-
quently, a simple answer to criminal jurisdictional problems seems very
remote.
The predicament has prompted some Indian law experts to en-
courage negotiated agreements as a solution to the tribal/state dispute
over criminal jurisdiction. Tim Vollmann, Regional Solicitor for the
United States Department of the Interior, participated in the Maine In-
dian Claims Settlement negotiations.210 Emphasizing that the land
claims disputes are not tantamount to the criminal jurisdictional contro-
versy in Oklahoma, Vollmann suggests that Oklahoma tribes consider a
similar approach to resolving the belabored, yet unresolved, issues of
criminal jurisdiction.211 In other words, Oklahoma tribes "have a real
interest in jurisdictional clarity and favorable enterprises."2 2 Tribes
could transfer criminal jurisdiction to the state in return for state conces-
sions that would benefit them and their enterprises.21 3
The most appealing bargaining area for Oklahoma tribes is state tax
be deluded or intimidated by the arrogance and audactiy of the Indians' lawyer, Tom Tureen." Id.
(quoting the Bangor Daily News).
207. 25 U.S.C. § 1724 (1982).
208. Restitution, supra note 21, at 145.
209. See Florida Indian (Miccosukee): Land Claims Settlement, 25 U.S.C.A. § 1741 (West
Supp. 1988); Connecticut Indian Land Claims Settlement, 25 U.S.C.A. § 1751 (West Supp. 1988).
The Commission on State-Tribal Relations negotiates cooperative agreements between states and
tribes, ranging from tax collection procedures to child adoption provisions. See FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW, supra note 2, at 547. In central Oklahoma, several tribes have entered into agreements with
counties to solve criminal jurisdiction problems. See Pearson, Cooperation Urged on Tribal Sover-
eignty, Tulsa World, Dec. 13, 1987, at Al, col.l.
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exemption involving non-tribal businesses on Indian land. In numerous
decisions, the Supreme Court has allowed states to impose taxes and reg-
ulatory authority over non-tribal enterprises.214 State impositions on In-
dian governments depend, absent congressional enactments, on
legitimate state interests. As the state interests become more acute, the
balance may tilt against the tribe. A tribe could trade its criminal juris-
diction for a statutory enactment that exempts these enterprises from
state taxation. The exemption would be most beneficial to the tribes, and
it would attract new business to the state.
Agreements have also been supported by Assistant Secretary of the
Interior for Indian Affairs Ross Swimmer, formerly the Chief of the
Cherokee tribe.215 Swimmer expressed great concern over the negative
attitudes that many companies have about leasing Indian land. He said
that these concerns result mainly from the uncertainties about which law
applies-state, federal, or tribal. Congressional enactments would pro-
vide clarity in this area. If written accordingly, a statute could also bene-
fit nontribal ventures on tribal land. For example, Oklahoma might
concede to allowing tax exemptions for nontribal corporations con-
ducting business on Indian land. Alternatively, the state, in acquiring
criminal jurisdiction over tribal land, could relinquish certain incorpora-
tion requirements as long as the principal place of business exists on tri-
bal land.
Interests will vary among the tribes, so each tribe should negotiate
its own agreement216 after evaluating its goals and activities.217 While a
bingo operation may work for one tribe, it may not necessarily be in the
best interest of another. For example, the Cherokees have turned a
struggling government into a profitable one by investing in such enter-
prises as a landscape business and nursery. 218
Undoubtedly this process would not achieve instant results. The
Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act took two years to reach comple-
tion.21 9 Such a final resolution of criminal jurisdiction, however, would
214. See, eg., Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, rehg denied, 464 U.S. 874 (1983); Washington v.
Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 911 (1980); White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
215. Interview with Ross Swimmer, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs (Feb.
26, 1988).
216. Telephone interview with Tim Vollmann, Regional Solicitor for the United States Dept. of
the Interior (May 18, 1988).
217. Id.
218. Interview, Swimmer, supra note 215.
219. See Restitution, supra note 21.
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certainly prove more expedient and less costly than decades of litigation.
There would be no more interests to weigh; congressional mandates
would set the parameters.
Finally, inextricably meshed in the legal principles of Indian law
linger the ethical concerns for maintaining tribal sovereignty. Although
tribal sovereignty has at times languished to virtual extermination, it has
nevertheless endured, "deeply engrained in our jurisprudence."220 Per-
haps the life left is attributable to the constancy of legal principles estab-
lished by Chief Justice Marshall two centuries ago, or to the will of the
Indian people,221 or to the constitutional rights that we as a nation have
vowed to protect. At least for these reasons, the centuries of treaties,
agreements, and statutes should serve those for whom they were
intended.
V. CONCLUSION
In 1883 the Supreme Court held that Indian tribes maintained ex-
clusive jurisdiction over criminal matters within their territory. Angered
by the decision, Congress enacted laws which limited criminal jurisdic-
tion in Indian Territory, but which did not entirely abrogate Indian au-
thority to adjudicate such matters. However, unpredictable court
decisions, clashing political interests, and volatile public attitudes have
left the issue far from settled. As a result, great tension has existed
among the states, tribes, and federal government with regard to regula-
tion of crime in Indian country.
Recent court decisions have concluded that the state does not have
criminal jurisdiction over Indian country in Oklahoma. Due to the
amount of time and money involved, though, disputes could be problem-
atic if they are left completely to the courts for resolution. Moreover,
some tribes may find the immense responsibilities of law enforcement
cumbersome and difficult to assume, especially over the checkerboard
220. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980).
221. Charles Wilkinson, a leading Indian law scholar, concluded:
These old laws emanate a kind of morality profoundly rare in our jurisprudence. It is far
more complicated than a sense of guilt or obligation, emotions frequently associated with
Indian policy. Somehow, those old negotiations - typically conducted in but a few days
on hot, dry plains between midlevel federal bureaucrats and seemingly ragtag Indian lead-
ers - are tremendously evocative. Real promises were made on those plains, and the
Senate of the United States approved them, making them real laws. My sense is that most
judges cannot shake that. Their training, experience, and, finally, their humanity - all of
the things that blend into the rule of law - brought them up short when it came to signing
opinions that would have obliterated those promises.
C. WILKINSON, supra note 8, at 121-22.
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configuration of Indian land in Oklahoma. Therefore, negotiated agree-
ments between the state and tribes, approved by Congress, would amelio-
rate many of the problems. In the long run, they would be much more
satisfactory than a perpetual string of court battles.
K Bliss Adams
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